

# 2019

## GLOBAL SOVEREIGN DEBT MONITOR



The **Global Sovereign Debt Monitor 2019** is an extract form

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Map showing the debt situation of critically indebted countries in the Global South, the trend and the suspension of payment by individual countries

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# Global Sovereign Debt Monitor

Currently, 122 countries in the Global South are critically in debt.

Jürgen Kaiser

The global debt situation has been at a dramatically high level for years and, at the same time, the debt has continued to rise. In recent years, the situation in three-quarters of the countries in critical debt has worsened further. This global debt crisis is being fuelled by excessive lending to poorer countries. Rising interest rates and falling commodity prices have already led to suspensions of payment in 17 countries.

## 1. Debt in the Global South

The debt report describes the debt situation of a country using five indicators that compare public, and external debt with economic performance (see Tab. 1 on the back cover). Unless otherwise indicated, all data refer to the reference date 31/12/2017. The higher the indicators examined, the more critical the debt situation is considered to be. If countries exceed thresholds derived from experience, they are classified into three stages of risk of

**The situation is slightly critical in 75 countries, critical in 40 countries, and even very critical in 7.**

over-indebtedness (see Tab. 2). The underlying methodology, which classifies the debt situation of the countries as "slightly critical", "critical" and "very critical", is described in detail on page 12 (see box "Methodology for the article 'Indebted Countries Worldwide'").

Currently, 122 out of a total of 154 examined countries<sup>1</sup> are critically in debt; just under 80 percent


(see Fig. 1). Only 24 of the examined countries show consistently un-problematic indicators. There was no analysable data available for the remaining eight countries. From a global perspective, the debt situation is slightly critical in 75 - about half - of the countries surveyed. In a further 20 percent, it is critical (40 countries) or even very critical (7 countries).

**In almost three-quarters of the 122 critically indebted countries, the majority of debt indicators have worsened.**

Thus, the number of countries in critical debt rose slightly in the course of 2017 from 119 to 122 countries. Countries in which the value of at least one debt indicator exceeds at least the lower of the three limits (see Tab. 2) or which have been certified by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as carrying a moderate or high risk of over-indebtedness are considered to be critically in debt. Only Lesotho was able to improve its situation compared to the previous year so that its debt can be assessed as uncritical.<sup>2</sup>

In almost three-quarters of the 122 critically indebted countries, the majority of debt indicators worsened. In one quarter, all five of the indicators examined deteriorated by more than 10 percent compared to four years ago.

As the map on the front cover shows, the debt situation is currently judged "very critical" in seven countries: Bhutan, Mongolia, Gambia, Cape Verde, Jamaica, Bahrain and Lebanon.



### 1.1. New Critically Indebted Countries

In five countries, the debt situation has deteriorated so much compared with the previous year that they now have a critical debt level - Iraq, the Philippines, Nauru, Equatorial Guinea and Bahrain.

While the debt situation in the first four of these countries is only 'slightly critical', **Bahrain** paints a much more dramatic picture. In just one year, its debt level has increased to "very critical". Bahrain, like its oil-rich neighbours, is a high-income country. The falling oil price has, in but a few years, increased debt relative to economic output from 10 percent to nearly 90 percent.

**Iraq** has only a 'slightly critical' debt situation, but is in the upper end of this category. Along with public debt in relation to economic performance 2017, the indicator which worsened most was foreign debt service in relation to export earnings, which is now, at almost 50 percent, clearly in the critical range. This is due to the sharp decline in the price of oil, which accounts for about 80 percent of the country's foreign exchange earnings and, indeed, about 85 percent of its government revenue.

*Only 24 of the countries investigated have debt indicators that are consistently unproblematic.*

The **Philippines**, a country with lower-middle income per capita, according to World Bank category

Fig. 1: Critically Indebted Countries Worldwide




Table 2: Levels of over-indebtedness (in per cent)

	No risk of debt distress	First level	Second level	Highest level
$\frac{\text{public debt}}{\text{GNI or GDP}}$	< 50	50-75	> 75-100	> 100
$\frac{\text{public debt}}{\text{annual government revenue}}$	< 200	200-300	> 300-400	> 400
$\frac{\text{external debt}}{\text{GNI or GDP}}$	< 40	40-60	> 60-80	> 80
$\frac{\text{external debt}}{\text{annual export earnings}}$	< 150	150-225	> 225-300	> 300
$\frac{\text{debt service}}{\text{annual export earnings}}$	< 15	15-22,5	> 22,5-30	> 30

risation, was a spectacular case of questionable indebtedness around the year 2000. Its borrowing, for example, for a nuclear power plant on top of a seismic fault line under the Markos dictatorship, ranks as a textbook example of illegitimate debt. The country has improved its situation by, among other things, prioritising debt servicing over all other expenditure by law (Automatic Appropriation Law). The consequences of this regulation have been an in part dramatic social polarisation on the one hand and a comparatively good rating on the international capital markets ("BBB" at Standard and Poor's) on the other. In 2017, however, national debt grew to more than twice the annual revenue due to rising public borrowing, and thus passed, albeit only marginally, the corresponding threshold.

In the small Pacific country of **Nauru**, which has a population of just 13,500, public debt has risen to 62 percent of Gross National Income, exceeding the lower threshold for this debt indicator. Although no other data on debt is available, it can be assumed that this is not a serious case of over-indebtedness. Nauru, like **Equatorial Guinea**, is a higher-middle income country. Following the price collapse of its main export product, the oil-rich African country shows only a single indicator of public debt beyond the lower threshold.

*The regions of Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America/the Caribbean are particularly affected by over-indebtedness.*

## 1.2. Debt Situation and Trend by Region


Looking at the individual regions of the world separately, it becomes clear that the regions of sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America/Caribbean are particularly affected by debt crises (see Fig. 2). There are hardly any countries in these regions whose debt situation is not critical. In the North Africa/Middle East, on the other hand, it is noticeable that fewer than half of the countries are actually critically in debt, but in three quarters of these the debt level is "critical" to "very critical". The trend in the North Africa/Middle East region is particularly clear: the debt situation has worsened in all critically indebted countries in this region.

## 1.3. Debt Situation and Trend by Income Group


If the countries examined are grouped according to World Bank income group categorisation<sup>3</sup>, it can be seen that though critically indebted high-income countries have higher debt indicators, the trend towards an escalation of the debt situation is weakest here. At the same time, relatively few countries in this income group are critically indebted (see Fig. 3).

Although the debt situation is not uncritical in any of the 33 low-income countries surveyed, it is relatively un-problematic, as 70 percent of countries are (still) at only a "slightly critical" level. Meaningful data are not available for Somalia and Syria. However, the trend towards deterioration is

**Fig. 2: Critically Indebted Countries by Region**



**Fig. 3: Critically Indebted Countries by Income**



**Table 3 - Payment suspension**

 Continuing suspension of payments	 Continuing suspension of payments	 Interim payment suspension	 Disputed demands
Beginning before 2015	Beginning 2015-2017	Between 2015 and 2017	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Cuba</li> <li>• Eritrea</li> <li>• North Korea</li> <li>• Somalia</li> <li>• Sudan</li> <li>• Syria</li> <li>• Zimbabwe</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Angola</li> <li>• Barbados</li> <li>• Gambia</li> <li>• Grenada</li> <li>• Mozambique</li> <li>• Sambia</li> <li>• São Tomé &amp; Príncipe</li> <li>• South Sudan</li> <li>• Venezuela</li> <li>• Yemen</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Belize</li> <li>• Chad</li> <li>• El Salvador</li> <li>• Republic of the Congo</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Cambodia</li> <li>• Iraq</li> <li>• Ukraine</li> </ul>

most pronounced in this group of countries. This is due to the strong representation in this income group of countries that have benefited from extensive debt relief through the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Multilateral Initiative since 1996. In recent years, they have borrowed particularly heavily following the stark reduction of the debt level (see box "The Special Situation of HIPCs", p. 8).

#### 1.4. Countries in Default

The most dramatic result of the debt crisis, which has been worsening for years, is that a large number of countries have already defaulted on all or part of their debt service payments (see Tab. 3). A default is called if a country has failed to meet payment obligations beyond the agreed period (usually 30 days) and this has been communicated publicly, or if the IMF or one of the major rating agencies classifies the country as "in default". Since this condition can change relatively quickly in both directions, Table 3 is a snapshot as of 31.12.2018.

The defaulting countries include countries that have been insolvent for several years (for these purposes, since before 2015), as has been the case with Zimbabwe since the mid-1990s. This category also includes those of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs), which formally have access to the debt relief initiative but have not reached

the initiative's decision point. This pertains to Eritrea, Somalia and Sudan. This category also includes countries outside the international financial system, such as Cuba and North Korea. Finally in Syria, there have been no on record payments to the majority of its creditors since the height of the civil war.

As a result of the developments described in the next section, these countries, which have been insolvent for some time, have been joined by 14 countries that have had to cease payments to foreign creditors, temporarily or for the longer term, since 2015 as a result of external shocks and political instability. Four of them have managed to become current on their obligations to creditors through rescheduling arrangements, such as Chad with Glencore, or through new borrowing, namely El Salvador, Congo and Belize.

**17 countries have currently had to stop their payments.**

However, ten countries have become insolvent since the beginning of 2015 and remain so as of 31.12.2018. Gambia is a special case; agreeing initially on a long-term debt settlement plan with its creditors during the course of 2018, but then being unable to implement it, the country is now again classified by the IMF as "in default". The number of countries in the ongoing payment de-

fault, which is the most visible expression of the ongoing debt crisis, has doubled since the survey of the 2018 debt report. All types of crises described below are represented in this group, so that a rapid relaxation of the situation cannot be expected through improvements in selected parameters such as of individual commodity prices.

Three countries - Cambodia, Iraq and Ukraine - are considered to be in default because, irrespective of their ability to pay, they refuse to service claims that are not considered legitimate. In Ukraine, this concerns a loan from the Russian Federation under the pro-Russian ex-president Viktor Yanukovich. In Cambodia, this concerns financing from even longer ago, namely those of the US government for the regime of General Lon Nol in the 1970s. Iraq and Kuwait are arguing over the validity of Saddam-era claims and the interpretation of the 2004 rescheduling agreement.

In addition to the countries listed in Table 3, other countries have payment arrears to bilateral public or private creditors. They are not listed individually in Table 3 because, unlike in most cases mentioned above, arrears are not due to the (potential) insolvency of the debtor but to the absence of an agreement between the debtor and the creditor. The largest group in this category are the HIPC's whose rescheduling agreements have not yet been implemented with all public and private creditors. This can occasionally be related to payment problems. In general, however, the creditor is not interested in a regulation in which he would have to renounce 90 percent of his claims officially but prefers to remain in a state of ongoing non-payment without formally giving up his claim.

*The number of countries in persistent default has doubled since the last debt report.*

### Box: The special history of HIPC's

As part of the multilateral debt relief initiatives of the 1990s and early 2000s, a group of countries (the so-called Heavily Indebted Poor Countries, HIPC's) had their foreign debt comprehensively reduced. The stated aim of this initiative of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank was to give these countries access to new credit. It was successful: in recent years, a large number of these countries have placed government bonds on the international capital market for the first time.

Although debt levels are still relatively low in the HIPC's due to their low level of initial debt as a result of the relief they received – the debt situation is described as "slightly critical" in 26 of the 35 countries, "critical" in 7, and "very critical" in only 2 countries – the trend is nevertheless alarming for this particular group of countries. In 30 of the 35 countries, the situation has worsened over the past four years – in some cases significantly.

In 15 HIPC's, all five debt indicators examined here have deteriorated by at least 10 percent. Last year, this was already the case for Ethiopia, Mozambique, Zambia, Liberia, Mauritania, Niger, Uganda, Cameroon, Tanzania, Haiti and Rwanda. New additions this year include Togo, Senegal, Niger, Chad, Burkina Faso and Benin.

Unlike other countries in the Global South, none of the former HIPC's has yet had to default on payments to its creditors. However, HIPC's are particularly affected by the factors that aggravate the crisis. Many of them continue to have little diversified economies. External factors, such as price volatility for the few export commodities that exist, threaten debt sustainability in some countries. A prominent case is Zambia, which has been hit by a collapse in copper prices and excessive borrowing.



This category also includes some other countries, most of which do not currently service private claims. These unregulated old debts can become explosive to the debtor if the creditor decides to sell his claims at a high discount to so-called vulture funds, which then try to get his hands on international assets or international transactions of the debtor through courts in third countries.

## 2. Crisis Triggers

There is no indication that this debt crisis will disappear "by itself", for example by a sudden surge in growth in vulnerable or already insolvent countries. On the contrary: As with the debt crisis of the 1980s and 1990s, the global economy is currently configured in such a way as to promote excessive lending from richer to poorer countries. This has come about through the comparatively low interest rates in North America, Europe and Japan, and a high need for infrastructure financing with relatively weak governance on the part of the recipient countries. This combination of pressure to lend in the Global North and receptiveness in the Global South has made these investments, particularly in the area of infrastructure development, a popular choice for investors in richer countries, who happily take the promised returns at face value. It is only with the interest offered in poorer countries that the profits can be made that the funds, banks and insurance companies need in order to meet their own domestic payment obligations, such as when they have to pay Riester pensions in Germany. The risks of defaults are then overlooked - be it by relying on bailouts from the IMF and other multilateral institutions. The willingness of foreign lenders to invest in poorer countries is correspondingly high.

*The risks of default are ignored when deciding on lending.*

As well as these precarious circumstances, which have put many countries at risk of not being able to pay their debts, or which have already brought this situation about, there are additional factors which come into play in individual countries which make the risk of over-indebtedness particularly acute. This occurs in three different scenarios, which can of course also overlap in individual countries:

### → Extractive economies with a particularly narrow export base

This refers to countries that are highly dependent on one or a few export products and close the gaps in their public budgets through international borrowing in the event of price collapses. Almost by definition, such loans lead to consumptive rather than productive expenditure; interest payments must be subsequently financed through effects of growth elsewhere in the economy or through savings in "soft" public spending such as education and health. Mongolia, Venezuela, Zambia and the Republic of Congo are examples of such extractive economies among the heavily indebted countries. Mozambique is also included which is in a special situation (the gas export revenues will only be realised in the future).

### → Countries with politically precarious situations

Some of the most indebted countries are in the midst of civil wars, are not servicing debt, and are sure to need debt relief whenever peace returns. Such countries include, for example, Syria and Yemen. There is also a whole slew of countries with intact statehood, which though below this threshold of open civil war, are in persistent or especially acute political crises. This makes their current borrowing particularly expensive and the repayment particularly uncertain. Such countries include very critically indebted Lebanon (the only country that has all the indicators in the highest possible category this year) as well as Sri Lanka and Ukraine.

*The current global economic set-up promotes excessive lending from richer to poorer countries.*



When everything is dependent on oil: States are particularly at risk of over-indebtedness if they are highly dependent on one or a few export products.

***A further exacerbation of the debt crisis is to be expected.***

→ **Countries that are exposed to particular external shocks beyond their own control**

Countries that, due to climate change, are exposed to dramatically increasing natural disasters serve as a particular example of this. This affects almost all Small Island Development States (SIDS), most dramatically the Cape Verde Islands, which have for years suffered from a long-lasting drought.

### **3. Outlook: Uncertainties will exacerbate the Debt Crisis**

If, in the foreseeable future, the debt crises described here, is to improve, then at least one of the following developments will have to occur:

- Countries will have to make tangible leaps in growth, which, on the one hand, would make it possible to finance current debt servicing and, on the other hand, would enable an ever greater degree of development financing without (external) debt.
- Indebted countries will have to be able to refinance their current debt servicing with new loans at significantly better terms than at present.

- The revenue side will have to improve noticeably - for example, through an increase in prices for goods exported by poorer countries.

There is not much to suggest that any of these developments will occur in the next twelve months. The global economy is rather characterised by a series of uncertainties that can be expected to further worsen the debt crisis:

As a result of US Federal Reserve interest-rate hikes, more and more capital that had been in search of lucrative investment possibilities in the global South is returning to the United States. As a result, refinancing current debt service through new borrowing is becoming more expensive for the countries concerned. However, this applies above all to the large emerging economies, and less so to the heavily indebted poorest countries, which are receiving more financing from Europe and China, and in particular more public funding.

Some emerging economies have experienced a broad economic and social crisis which, among other things, is affecting their role as "alternative drivers of the global economy". These crises can also indirectly affect poorer countries, if infrastructure investments, investors or tourists from emerging economies such as China, Brazil or Saudi Arabia, which have in recent years contributed to net inflows to poorer countries, fail to materialise.

A slowdown in global trade as a result of the US-China trade dispute could also seriously affect the revenue side of many poorer countries, because, for example, of a drop in Chinese demand for raw materials and primary products.

A hallmark of the recent wave of capital exports to low-income countries is the large proportion of bond sales (compared to traditional bank loans). Not all, but a significant portion of the bonds sold have their maturities (bullet maturities) in the first few years of the next decade. This means that the entire bond becomes due in one lump when it expires. In normal cases, a government should have saved the relevant amounts of capital. There is, however, a great temptation - especially across electoral periods - to leave the payment obligati-

on to a possible successor government or to trust that old loans can be financed with new ones. The latter, however, could become increasingly difficult in times of rising global interest rates.

In view of this expected worsening of the debt situation in poorer countries and the cessations of payments that have already occurred, it is now more important than ever to create a mechanism for dealing with debt crises. There is wide agreement that the existing procedures are not sufficient. There is, however, no satisfactory answer from the creditor side to the question of what should take their place.

***It is currently more important than ever to create a procedure for dealing with debt crises.***

- 1 154 countries were considered in the current analysis. Of the 194 independent states and territories that are members of the United Nations, there are 40 countries which have not been included. They are members of the EU or the OECD. Mexico alone was included in the study because of its special historical importance, despite its membership of the OECD.
- 2 Libya was listed in the 2018 debt report as a country with a critical debt level, albeit on the basis of very weak data. There is no data available for reliable classification for 2017.
- 3 The World Bank divides countries into four groups according to their per capita income: low-income countries (<\$ 995), lower-middle income countries (\$ 995-3,895), upper-middle income countries (\$ 3,895 12,055 US dollars) and high-income countries (> 12,055 US dollars).

## Box 1 - Methodology of the article: "Indebted States Worldwide"

The Debt Monitor analyses **three dimensions** of debt:

- the **debt situation**, i.e. the level of debt indicators as at the reporting date 31 December 2017,
- the **trend**, i.e. the change in this debt situation over a period of four years (2013-2017), and
- the intermediate and ongoing suspension of **debt service payments** by individual countries.

The debt indicators for the analysis are:

$$\frac{\text{public debt}}{\text{gross domestic product}}$$

**Is the government more indebted at home and abroad than the productivity of the entire economy allows?**

Public debt includes the explicit and implicit liabilities of the public sector - from central government to public enterprises. Public debt also includes the debts of private companies for which the state has issued a guarantee.

$$\frac{\text{public debt}}{\text{annual government revenue}}$$

**Is the government so heavily indebted at home and abroad that its income can no longer guarantee ongoing debt servicing?**

$$\frac{\text{external debt}}{\text{gross domestic product}}$$

**Does the entire economy have more payment obligations vis-à-vis foreign countries than its economic performance allows?**

External debt includes the liabilities of both the public and private sectors of a country vis-à-vis foreign creditors. The indicator points to the overall economic burden i.e. whether an economy produces enough goods and services to service its debt.

$$\frac{\text{external debt}}{\text{annual export earnings}}$$

**Are the external debts of the state, citizens and companies so high that exports cannot generate enough foreign exchange to pay the debts?**

In most cases, external debt cannot be repaid in local currency. Debt servicing requires the generation of foreign exchange through exports, migrant remittances, or new indebtedness.

$$\frac{\text{debt service}}{\text{annual export earnings}}$$

**Is the current external debt servicing of the state, citizens, and companies so high that exports do not at present generate enough foreign exchange to pay interest and repayments due in the current year?**

This indicator shows the ratio of annual repayment and interest payments to export earnings. It shows whether the annual debt service - irrespective of the overall debt level - overstretches the current performance of an economy in a given year.

There are three risk levels for each of the five indicators (see Table 2, p. 5). The background of the values in different shades of orange indicates the level to which the value is to be allocated (see Table 1, pp. 14-16). A dark orange-coloured value means that all three thresholds are exceeded and the value must therefore be allocated to the third risk level.

Based on the debt indicators, the **debt situation of a country** is divided into three categories: slightly critical, critical, and very critical (see world map on pp. 1-3). In line with the three risk levels for each of the five debt indicators, each country has a value between 0 and 15. For example, if a country with all five debt indicators is at the highest risk level according to Table 2 (p. 5), i.e. if it exceeds all three limit values for all five debt indicators, it has a value of 15. The categories are defined as follows:

- 0-4 → slightly critical
- 5-10 → critical
- 11-15 → very critical

The **trend** indicates for each debt indicator whether it has changed by at least 10 per cent in the four years from 2013 to 2017 (see Table 1, pp. 14-16). In addition, an aggregated debt trend was calculated for each country (see world map). If more debt indicators have improved than deteriorated over a period of four years, the general trend is presented as a decline. If more indicators have deteriorated than improved, the general debt situation is said to have risen.

**Permanent and interim suspensions of payment** on the basis of Table 3 on p. 7 are also shown on the world map.

**Tab. 1 - countries at risk of debt distress (as of 2017)**

indicator  countries by regions	public debt / gross domestic product	trend¹	public debt / annual government revenue	trend¹	external debt / gross domestic product	trend¹	external debt / annual export earnings	trend¹	debt service / annual export earnings	trend¹	risk of debt distress according to IMF²
<b>South Asia, Southeast Asia, Pacific</b>											
Afghanistan	7,0	—	27,7	—	12,1	▼	186,1	▲	4,1	▲	
Bangladesh	33,1	—	323,9	—	18,1	▲	120,1	—	5,5	—	
Bhutan	106,3	—	397,5	▲	113,3	▲	353,3	▲	10,5	—	
Cambodia	30,4	—	142,1	▼	57,2	▲	73,1	—	3,9	▼	
India	71,2	—	347,3	—	19,8	▼	101,0	▲	10,1	▲	
Indonesia	28,8	▲	205,4	▲	36,0	▲	177,0	▲	34,0	▲	
Kiribati	26,3	▲	21,7	▲	NDA		NDA		NDA		
Laos	63,6	▲	378,3	▲	90,8	—	248,6	▲	13,4	▲	
Malaysia	54,1	—	276,0	▲	69,5	—	115,6	▲	4,9	▼	
Maldives	63,9	▲	220,1	—	32,2	▲	39,2	▲	5,1	—	
Marshall Islands	25,6	▼	37,7	▼	NDA		NDA		NDA		
Micronesia	24,5	▼	35,4	▼	NDA		NDA		NDA		
Mongolia	83,5	▲	285,9	▲	285,5	▲	410,7	—	56,2	▲	
Nauru	62,0	▼	NDA		NDA		NDA		NDA		
Nepal	26,4	▼	108,8	▼	20,1	—	165,7	—	8,5	—	
Pakistan	67,0	—	429,0	—	26,3	▲	286,0	▲	22,6	—	
Papua New Guinea	36,9	▲	204,1	▲	85,6	▼	169,0	▼	27,1	▲	
Philippines	39,9	▼	204,2	▼	19,4	—	74,4	▼	11,3	▲	
Samoa	49,1	—	143,2	—	53,5	—	154,5	▼	8,9	▲	
Solomon Islands	9,4	▼	22,0	▼	28,6	▲	53,6	▲	3,9	▼	
Sri Lanka	79,1	▲	572,6	—	59,1	—	260,1	—	21,2	▲	
Tonga	NDA		NDA		39,1	—	121,3	▼	9,9	▲	
Tuvalu	37,0	▲	29,7	▲	NDA		NDA		NDA		
Vanuatu	48,4	▲	153,8	▲	46,0	▲	NDA		NDA		
Vietnam	58,5	▲	248,2	▲	48,8	▲	45,7	—	5,9	▲	
<b>Sub-Saharan Africa</b>											
Angola	65,0	▲	385,0	▲	31,6	▲	103,8	▲	13,4	▲	
Benin	54,6	▲	292,5	▲	31,3	▲	114,4	▲	4,2	▲	
Burkina Faso	38,1	▲	175,7	▲	25,0	▲	86,0	▲	3,7	▲	
Burundi	48,4	▲	368,7	▲	17,7	▼	245,5	▼	14,4	—	
Cameroon	36,9	▲	247,0	▲	30,3	▲	154,3	▲	10,7	▲	
Cape Verde	125,8	▲	441,8	—	104,4	▲	204,5	▲	5,9	—	
Central African Republic	52,9	▲	386,1	▼	37,4	—	NDA		NDA		
Chad	52,5	▲	352,0	▲	31,9	▲	NDA		NDA		
Comoros	32,4	▲	113,6	▲	25,3	—	124,6	—	1,9	▲	
Congo, Democratic Republic	18,1	—	174,1	▲	14,0	▼	38,3	▼	3,0	▼	
Congo, Republic	130,8	▲	458,4	▲	56,1	▲	109,8	▲	NDA		
Côte d'Ivoire	47,0	—	244,7	▲	34,4	—	105,6	▲	17,6	▲	
Djibouti	31,8	▼	98,8	▼	112,5	▲	338,5	▲	11,1	▲	
Equatorial Guinea	37,4	▲	219,6	▲	9,6	—	19,7	—	NDA		
Eritrea	131,2	—	890,5		NDA		NDA		NDA		
Ethiopia	54,2	▲	363,8	▲	33,2	▲	397,6	▲	20,8	▲	
Gabon	62,7	▲	382,1	▲	45,1	▲	116,6	—	NDA		
Gambia	88,0	▲	459,5	—	65,9	▲	247,5	▲	16,9	▲	

Tab. 1 - countries at risk of debt distress (as of 2017), continued

indicator \ countries by regions	public debt / gross domestic product	trend <sup>1</sup>	public debt / annual government revenue	trend <sup>1</sup>	external debt / gross domestic product	trend <sup>1</sup>	external debt / annual export earnings	trend <sup>1</sup>	debt service / annual export earnings	trend <sup>1</sup>	risk of debt distress according to IMF <sup>2</sup>
Ghana	71,8	▲	410,8	▲	48,1	▲	106,2	—	10,4	▲	
Guinea	37,9	▲	246,5	—	14,3	▼	31,7	▼	1,4	▼	
Guinea-Bissau	53,9	▲	294,8	—	24,3	▼	87,8	▼	2,4	▼	
Kenya	54,2	▲	296,8	▲	35,7	▲	243,8	▲	14,8	▲	
Madagascar	36,0	—	244,1	▼	30,3	—	82,2	▲	3,2	▼	
Malawi	59,2	—	233,4	▲	35,1	▲	172,9	▲	5,7	▲	
Mali	35,4	▲	176,8	▲	29,3	—	127,6	▲	4,5	▲	
Mauretania	56,6	▲	344,5	▲	85,2	▲	207,3	▲	13,2	▲	
Mauritius	64,0	—	281,1	—	155,9	▲	141,9	▲	21,0	▼	
Mozambique	102,1	▲	357,8	▲	100,8	▲	216,5	▲	5,0	▲	
Namibia*	41,3	▲	132,0	▲	60,2	—	172,5	—	NDA		
Niger	45,3	▲	211,4	▲	47,2	▲	288,5	▲	9,9	▲	
Nigeria	21,8	▲	351,4	▲	11,0	▲	76,9	▲	6,8	▲	
Rwanda	40,5	▲	176,9	▲	37,4	▲	161,4	▲	3,9	▲	
São Tomé and Príncipe	88,4	▲	370,8	▲	66,6	—	276,3	▼	3,4	▼	
Senegal	48,3	▲	249,4	▲	56,2	▲	212,6	▲	14,2	▲	
Seychelles	63,6	—	174,7	—	NDA		NDA		NDA		
Sierra Leone	63,9	▲	424,3	▲	47,3	▲	NDA		NDA		
South Africa	53,0	▲	187,5	▲	52,0	▲	160,4	▲	12,2	▲	
South Sudan	62,7	▲	150,6	▲	NDA		NDA		NDA		
Sudan	121,6	▲	1689,5	▲	20,3	▼	387,3	—	4,2	▼	
Tanzania	37,0	▲	232,1	▲	35,4	▲	205,6	▲	8,4	▲	
Togo	75,7	▲	352,0	▲	32,8	▲	105,9	▲	5,8	▲	
Uganda	40,0	▲	266,5	▲	44,3	▲	222,5	▲	3,8	▲	
Zambia	63,1	▲	358,8	▲	65,2	▲	179,4	▲	18,1	▲	
Zimbabwe	82,3	▲	374,8	▲	59,1	—	188,6	—	8,4	▼	
Latin America, Caribbean											
Antigua and Barbuda	86,8	—	416,8	▼	NDA		NDA		NDA		
Argentina	57,6	▲	165,2	▲	33,7	—	367,6	—	NDA		
Bahamas	54,6	▲	317,8	—	NDA		NDA		NDA		
Barbados	157,3	▲	553,2		NDA		NDA		NDA		
Belize	99,0	▲	338,6	▲	82,9	—	133,8	▲	9,7	▼	
Brasil	84,0	▲	278,9	▲	27,0	▲	205,9	▲	36,2	▲	
Colombia	49,3	▲	193,6	▲	41,3	▲	232,7	▲	41,6	▲	
Costa Rica	48,9	▲	351,8	▲	47,5	▲	128,5	▲	14,8	▼	
Dominica	82,7	—	176,9	▼	54,8	▼	121,2	▼	11,7	—	
Dominican Republic	37,2	—	249,4	—	41,1	—	153,1	—	10,2	▼	
Ecuador	45,4	▲	141,5	▲	39,3	▲	178,5	▲	29,3	▲	
El Salvador	67,9	▲	313,5	—	71,5	—	226,2	▲	20,2	—	
Grenada	70,4	▼	273,4	▼	49,2	▼	89,0	▼	9,4	—	
Guatemala	24,7	—	228,9	—	31,0	—	156,6	▲	28,6	▲	
Guyana	52,2	▼	172,3	▼	43,5	▼	50,8	—	3,6	▼	
Haiti	31,0	▲	175,7	▲	26,2	▲	138,4	▲	1,5	▲	
Honduras	39,5	—	148,2	—	40,6	—	114,3	—	23,9	▲	
Jamaica	101,0	▼	348,2	▼	103,2	▲	286,0	—	27,3	—	

**Tab. 1 - countries at risk of debt distress (as of 2017), continued**

indicator \ countries by regions	public debt / gross domestic product	trend <sup>1</sup>	public debt / annual government revenue	trend <sup>1</sup>	external debt / gross domestic product	trend <sup>1</sup>	external debt / annual export earnings	trend <sup>1</sup>	debt service / annual export earnings	trend <sup>1</sup>	risk of debt distress according to IMF <sup>2</sup>
Mexico	54,3	▲	219,3	▲	40,5	▲	101,6	—	14,0	▲	
Nicaragua	33,3	▲	131,6	—	85,3	—	199,1	—	19,8	▲	
Panama	37,8	▲	187,6	▲	91,5	▼	590,5	▲	NDA		
Paraguay	19,5	▲	102,4	▲	57,0	—	111,8	—	12,4	—	
Peru	25,4	▲	139,0	▲	33,6	—	127,3	—	21,7	▲	
Saint Kitts and Nevis*	62,9	▼	208,3	—	20,9	▼	351,5	▲	NDA		
Saint Lucia	70,6	—	291,4	—	39,0	▲	61,5	▼	4,6	▼	
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	73,8	—	245,7	▼	42,7	—	117,0	▼	11,6	▼	
Surinam	69,3	▲	354,1	▲	49,7	—	83,8	—	NDA		
Uruguay	65,7	—	220,6	—	68,5	▲	40,3	▼	7,1	▼	
Venezuela	38,9	▼	430,2	▲	43,7	▲	312,8	▲	NDA		
<b>Northern Africa, Middle East</b>											
Egypt	103,0	▲	473,5	▲	35,9	▲	190,3	▲	15,1	▲	
Bahrain	88,5	▲	485,4	▲	147,6	—	339,0	—	NDA		
Iraq	59,7	▲	177,9	▲	38,1	▲	106,6	▲	47,1	▲	
Jordan	95,9	▲	367,3	—	75,3	—	198,1	▲	12,4	▲	
Lebanon	146,8	—	684,4	—	141,7	—	341,3	▲	70,6	▲	
Morocco	65,1	—	248,3	▲	46,5	▲	125,3	—	9,8	▼	
Tunisia	70,3	▲	288,3	▲	82,8	▲	178,1	▲	17,2	▲	
Yemen*	74,5	▲	2.135,0	▲	22,6	▲	18.382,3	▲	NDA		
<b>Europe, GUS</b>											
Albania	71,8	—	259,0	▼	69,4	—	198,1	—	10,4	▼	
Armenia	53,5	▲	252,2	▲	85,9	▲	182,4	—	27,0	▼	
Azerbaijan	54,0	▲	154,9	▲	39,1	▲	72,1	▲	10,7	—	
Belarus	53,4	▲	137,3	▲	75,6	▲	105,7	▲	11,8	▲	
Bosnia and Herzegovina	39,5	▼	93,0	—	79,8	—	184,8	▼	15,6	—	
Georgia	44,9	▲	154,4	▲	109,8	▲	181,3	▲	29,4	▲	
Kazakhstan	20,8	▲	110,6	▲	118,4	▲	287,1	▲	47,9	▲	
Kyrgyzstan	56,0	▲	163,4	▲	111,2	▲	313,3	▲	29,9	▲	
Macedonia	39,2	▲	135,6	▲	78,9	▲	133,6	—	13,7	▼	
Moldova	31,5	▲	104,4	▲	80,7	▲	175,1	▲	10,7	▼	
Montenegro	67,2	▲	164,4	▲	64,4	—	134,5	—	13,4	▼	
Serbia	62,5	—	141,5	▼	89,6	—	153,5	▼	22,0	▼	
Tajikistan	50,4	▲	170,0	▲	71,3	▲	216,2	▲	26,1	▲	
Turkey	28,3	—	90,7	—	54,1	▲	211,4	▲	40,2	▲	
Ukraine	71,0	▲	180,7	▲	98,4	▲	179,3	—	20,7	▼	

<sup>1</sup> ▲ Increase by more than 10 per cent; ▼ decrease by more than 10 per cent; — stagnation (changes by less than 10 per cent)

<sup>2</sup> □ low risk of debt distress; ■ medium risk of debt distress; ■ high risk of debt distress; ■ incapable of payment; □ no risk assessment by IMF and World Bank

Sources: World Bank: „International Debt Statistics 2019“, [data.worldbank.org/products/ids?cid=EXT\\_WBPubsAlerts\\_P\\_EXT](http://data.worldbank.org/products/ids?cid=EXT_WBPubsAlerts_P_EXT); IMF: „World Economic Outlook 2017“, [imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2017/02/weodata/index.aspx](http://imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2017/02/weodata/index.aspx) and CIA: „World Factbook“, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook>.

All data as of 31.12.2017, data marked with \* as of 31.12.2016.

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